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F arm bill discussions are be-ginning in earnest, as groups prepare for congressional 
hearings and possible legislative 
action in 2006. A common outcome 
of organized discussions is an ex-
pressed need for a better federal 
safety net for farmers. This out-
come is somewhat surprising in 
light of the existing safety net for 
producers of currently supported 
fi eld crops. As was demonstrated 
in a previous Iowa Ag Review (“Risk 
Free Farming,” Winter 2004), pro-
ducers of program crops who farm 
their own land and successfully 
get their crop into the ground face 
almost no risk that their returns 
over variable costs of production 
will fall below the average returns 
without government support, as 
shown in Figure 1. While the situ-
ation depicted in Figure 1 is not 
directly applicable elsewhere, the 
majority of land-owning producers 
of corn, soybeans, and wheat face 
practically no risk that they will not 
cover their cash production costs. 
So what motivates the widely held 
perception that farmers need an im-
proved safety net?
RISK-FREE FOR WHOM?
The fi nding that the current price 
support and crop insurance pro-
grams greatly reduce fi nancial 
risk only holds for producers who 
do not have annual cash land ex-
penses. A recent survey by Iowa 
State University economist Mike 
Safety Net Design for the New Farm Bill
Duffy (“Recent Trends in Farmland 
Ownership”) shows that 74 percent 
of Iowa farmland in 2002 was held 
debt free, so cash outlays for debt 
service do not alone signifi cantly 
increase risk. However, the same 
survey also showed that 60 percent 
of farmland in Iowa is leased. And in 
2002, 70 percent of leased land was 
cash rented. It seems likely that 
both proportions have increased 
since then.
A farmer who cash rents land 
is in a much riskier position than 
a farmer who farms owned land 
debt free. For the renter, land rent 
is a cash-variable expense just as 
real as cash outlays for fertilizer, 
seed, and fuel. The land-owning 
farmer in Figure 1 faces an op-
portunity cost of land—after all, 
the landowner could always lease 
the farm rather than farm it—but 
no cash costs. This allows the 
land-owning farmer to more easily 
survive a revenue shortfall in any 
given year. Figure 2 depicts the risk 
situation for the Figure 1 farmer if 
he cash rented land as opposed to 
owning the land. The level of cash 
rent today with government pro-
grams is approximately $160/acre 
for productive Iowa farmland. The 
expected value of government pay-
ments is approximately $90/acre. 
Thus, if all this value were refl ected 
in land rents, then cash rents would 
fall to $70/acre with the removal of 
government support. As shown, the 
effects of the current safety net are 
quite limited for the land renter. It is 
only the land owner who truly faces 
a “risk-free” condition.
That 60 percent of farmers face 
the risk shown in Figure 2 and 40 
percent face the risk-free situation 
shown in Figure 1 may explain at 
least some of the perception that 
FIGURE 1. EFFECT OF CURRENT FARM SAFETY NET ON RISK FOR AN IOWA CORN 
FARMER WHO FARMS OWNED LAND
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a better farm safety net is needed. 
After all, if non-farming landown-
ers capture most of the benefit 
of farm programs, what is left for 
farm operators?
WHAT ABOUT CROP INSURANCE?
Prevalent farmer dissatisfaction with 
the current crop insurance program 
may be another reason why so many 
people believe we need a better 
safety net. The program would seem 
to run in a manner that is highly 
favorable to farmer interests. Tax-
payers pay for the overhead of the 
program, agent commissions, loss 
adjustment costs, company profi ts, 
and the costs of developing new 
products. And premium subsidies 
mean that farmer-paid premiums do 
not cover even half of the insurance 
indemnities that are paid out. 
But dissatisfaction with the 
program is widespread. There is a 
litany of complaints: premiums are 
too high for the amount of protec-
tion provided; yield guarantees lag 
the amount at risk because they 
do not refl ect current technology; 
farmers who suffer through one or 
more years of poor growing condi-
tions face dramatically lower pro-
tection levels and higher premium 
rates even though the inherent 
risk they face remains unchanged; 
and fi nally, honest farmers suffer 
excessive premium rates because 
program rules are taken advantage 
of by unscrupulous agents and 
farmers. Perhaps no program can 
satisfy all farmers, but the level 
of dissatisfaction with the current 
crop insurance program suggests 
that there may indeed be some-
thing fundamentally wrong.
WHY THE FOCUS ON PRICE?
The last complaint about the current 
federal safety net is that because 
federal farm bill programs focus ex-
clusively on price, payments often 
arrive when farmers do not need 
fi nancial help and may not arrive in 
years when farm income is low. Con-
sider the circumstances of Illinois 
corn farmers this year. Many of them 
will not harvest much of a crop be-
cause of dry weather. The decline in 
this year’s crop prospects has driven 
the price of corn higher, which sug-
gests that farm bill payments for the 
2005 crop may be limited to only 
FIGURE 2. EFFECT OF CURRENT FARM SAFETY NET ON RISK FOR AN IOWA CORN 
FARMER WHO FARMS RENTED LAND
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direct payments. This is in contrast 
to the 2004 bin-busting crop, which 
drove the market price down and 
farm bill payments up, even though 
market income for most corn farm-
ers was quite adequate. 
In the Spring 2005 issue of Iowa 
Ag Review, we argued that the cur-
rent farm bill is “mistargeted” be-
cause low prices, rather than low 
revenue, triggers payments. We of-
fered an alternative revenue-targeted 
program based on the Group Risk 
Income Protection (GRIP) insurance 
plan that would hit a revenue target 
much better than does the current 
program. This result is no surprise: 
if Congress wants to make sure that 
revenue achieves a given level, then 
payments should be triggered when-
ever revenue falls below that level. 
The question is, why does Congress 
target price in the fi rst place? It 
seems to make more sense to target 
revenue rather than price. 
One answer to this puzzle could 
be that it is easier to pass farm leg-
islation that pays out when prices 
are low because low prices affect 
all farmers of a crop. If legislation 
targeted low revenue at the county, 
crop-reporting district, or state level, 
then those producers who farm in 
high-risk areas would receive pay-
ments more frequently than would 
farmers in low-risk areas because 
low yields would drive down rev-
enue more frequently in the high-risk 
areas. This explanation would seem 
to be supported by the frequent 
complaints from Corn Belt farmers 
that their low loss experience in the 
crop insurance program is somehow 
subsidizing the premiums of farmers 
who live in states with frequently 
high loss ratios. If this explanation 
is correct, then Congress might be 
unable to move to a program that 
targets revenue unless the revenue 
targeted is national revenue, in 
which case if any farmer of a crop 
received a payment, then all farmers 
would receive one. Representative 
Charles Stenholm’s Supplemental 
Income Payments for Farmers pro-
posal of 1999 (H.R. 2792) set a prec-
edent for this type of target.
An alternative explanation for 
why Congress targets price is based 
on history. Taking a step back and 
looking at all aspects of the farm 
safety net, one could surmise that 
Congress is indeed attempting to 
hit a revenue target. But instead of 
using one effi cient policy to achieve 
that targeting, it is using three. Com-
modity programs support price. 
Crop insurance supports yields. 
And when disaster strikes, ad hoc 
disaster programs provide addition-
al yield support. Because revenue is 
the product of price and yield, sup-
porting price and yield separately 
does indeed support revenue. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
Congress repeatedly tried to induce 
farmers to buy more crop insurance. 
Congress knew that higher participa-
tion rates meant that the farm sector 
would be supported whenever low 
yields or low prices occurred. But 
high participation only came about 
with the dramatically increased pre-
mium subsidies. Congress found that 
it could only achieve its goal of an ef-
fective safety net that guards against 
both low prices and low yields by 
turning the crop insurance program 
into an entitlement program that 
provides benefi ts with relatively little 
in co-payments.
TAKING STOCK TODAY
Has Congress largely achieved ef-
fective revenue safety by support-
ing prices with the farm bill and 
supporting yields with the crop 
insurance program? The answer is 
a qualifi ed yes. One of the qualifi ca-
tions is the long list of farmer com-
plaints about the crop insurance 
program previously discussed. The 
other qualifi cation is that the safety 
net is not cost-effective. Why sup-
port price in low-price years without 
accounting for above-average yields? 
And why support yields in low-yield 
years without accounting for the 
benefi ts of high prices? Targeting 
revenue explicitly would be much 
more cost-effective. 
Another redundancy is that most 
farmers now purchase revenue insur-
ance, not yield insurance. In 2004, 
Revenue Assurance and Crop Reve-
nue Coverage, the two most popular 
forms of revenue insurance, covered 
126 million acres of cropland, nearly 
60 percent of all cropland in the crop 
insurance program. This implies that 
farmers can receive both an insur-
ance indemnity and a commodity 
payment to compensate for a drop in 
price. For example, many corn farm-
ers received an insurance indemnity 
for their 2004 crop because of low 
prices. In addition, they received 
a loan defi ciency payment and a 
countercyclical payment. Given that 
taxpayers fund both programs, why 
should farmers receive double com-
pensation for the same drop in price?
Innovations in farm programs 
come about slowly and rarely. When 
the 2002 farm bill was passed, revenue 
insurance was still relatively new and 
most farmers still purchased yield 
insurance. So 2002 farm bill programs 
to support price could largely still be 
thought of as a critical part of a total 
safety net that supported revenue. But 
with most farmers now insuring rev-
enue directly, perhaps Congress will 
rethink its overall approach to sup-
porting farm sector income.
We have previously discussed an 
alternative commodity program that 
would make payments when county 
average yield times season average 
. . . with most farmers 
now insuring revenue              
directly, perhaps Congress 
will rethink its overall          
approach to supporting 
farm sector income.
Continued on page 12
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Domestic and international responses to bovine spongi-form encephalopathy (BSE) 
in North America have permanently 
altered international market oppor-
tunities for U.S. beef. As expected, 
most international markets imme-
diately banned imports of U.S. beef 
when the fi rst U.S. case was report-
ed in December 2003. Beef and beef 
variety meat exports in 2004 fell 75 
percent by volume and 79 percent 
by value compared with 2003 levels. 
By April 2005, strong demand from 
Mexico and the reopening of a few 
markets helped overcome some of 
the overall trade loss, but most ma-
jor markets remained closed to U.S. 
beef (see Table 1).
The second U.S. case of BSE, of-
fi cially confi rmed in June 2005, set 
back much of the progress made in 
re-opening international markets. 
Taiwan, Indonesia, and several 
other countries that had re-opened 
their borders to U.S. beef reinstated 
bans, and South Korea immediately 
expressed strong reluctance to 
move forward with negotiations to 
resume trade. However, the rush by 
Taiwanese consumers to purchase 
discounted U.S. beef already on 
store shelves indicates that, at least 
for some consumers, low price out-
weighed any concern over the safety 
of U.S. beef, if such concern existed. 
Early reports from Taiwan indicated 
that reinstating the ban may have 
been an automatic reaction that will 
be reversed, but it is diffi cult to say 
how long a reversal will take.
On the other hand, the Japa-
nese government’s calm reaction 
to the news of a second BSE case 
in the United States refl ected the 
stated expectation that more than 
one BSE-positive animal would be 
found in the United States. It may 
also refl ect the fact that Japan has 
A New World Market for U.S. Beef
yet to set a timeline for opening its 
borders to U.S. and Canadian beef, 
and confl icting test results in the 
second case appear to be causing 
additional delays by Japan.
CONSUMER OPINION AND THE BEEF 
SAFEGUARD IN JAPAN
Although the Japanese government 
remains committed to negotiations 
to reopen its market, U.S. exporters 
will face new marketing challenges 
when access is allowed. With 20 
confi rmed cases of BSE and 100 
percent testing of cattle, reports 
of new cases in Japan’s cattle herd 
have little impact on overall con-
sumer behavior. However, surveys 
continue to show strong consumer 
opinion against resuming imports 
of U.S. beef under the terms of the 
Beef Export Verifi cation Program 
drafted by Japan and the United 
States. Although consumer opin-
ion often does not refl ect actual 
purchasing decisions and not all 
Japanese consumers will shun 
U.S. beef, the Australian industry’s 
classifi cation as free of BSE and its 
unchallenged hold on the Japanese 
market will make it diffi cult for U.S. 
beef to re-capture market share.
Another obstacle for U.S. beef is 
Japan’s safeguard system. The safe-
guard is triggered when imports in-
crease by more than 17 percent from 
volumes imported during the previ-
ous Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) on a 
cumulative quarterly basis. Once trig-
gered, the beef tariff increases from 
38.5 percent to 50 percent and the 
safeguard remains in place for the 
remainder of the current fi scal year. 
Import volumes of chilled beef and 
frozen beef are measured separately, 
so the safeguard can be triggered for 
one or both categories of beef in a 
given quarter. The sudden losses of 
Canada and then the United States 
from the market reduced import 
volumes, thereby reducing safeguard 
trigger levels. As the end of the fi rst 
quarter of JFY 2005 (April-June) ap-
proached, concern arose that the 
safeguard would be triggered by in-
creased imports from Australia.
TABLE 1. TOP FIVE MARKETS FOR U.S. BEEF AND BEEF VARIETY MEAT EXPORTS, 
JANUARY-APRIL 2005 COMPARED WITH JANUARY-APRIL 2003 AND 2004
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Despite requests from major 
trading partners, Japan has never 
failed to implement higher safe-
guard tariffs on either beef or pork, 
regardless of the market conditions 
that created the ebbs and surges in 
import volume. Table 2 shows Japa-
nese imports in 2003 before the fi rst 
BSE case was found in the United 
States, and in 2004 with both the 
United States and Canada banned 
from the market. The lower import 
levels in JFY 2004 make it more 
likely that beef safeguards will be 
triggered after the United States and 
Canada re-enter the market.
INCREASED PROCESSING CAPACITY         
IN CANADA
U.S. beef will also face pressure from 
the increase in Canadian slaughter 
capacity necessitated by the extend-
ed closing of the U.S. border to live 
Canadian cattle. In June 2004, Cana-
da was slaughtering around 77,000 
head of cattle per week, already a 
high slaughter rate for the Canadian 
industry. In June 2005, the Canadian 
Meat Council estimated that Cana-
dian slaughter capacity could reach 
107,000 head per week by November. 
The additional 30,000 head per week 
would equal 1.5 million more head 
per year—this at a time when the 
United States is facing underutilized 
beef slaughter capacity.
In 2002, the last full year of live 
exports to the United States, Canada 
slaughtered about 3.5 million cattle 
in inspected facilities and exported 
just over 1.0 million live cattle to the 
United States for slaughter (see Ta-
ble 3). By 2004, Canadian slaughter 
increased to more than 3.9 million 
head with no live exports. At the 
same time, the size of the domestic 
herd increased from 13.8 million 
head in 2003 to 16.8 million head in 
2004 (January 1 herd inventories). 
Part of this expansion is the result 
of herd aging, as producers carried 
8.6 percent more beef cattle in 2004. 
To counter this problem, Canada 
has funded a Herd Management for 
Older Animals Program to help cull 
older animals from the national herd. 
As a result, many older animals will 
not be slaughtered for beef.
Even with the increase in herd 
size, the slaughter capacity esti-
mated to be on-line by November 
would more than accommodate all 
of Canada’s slaughter needs without 
exporting live cattle. This is not to 
say that Canada will not export live 
cattle to the United States now that 
an appeals court has ruled that the 
border can be reopened, and some 
of Canada’s increased capacity can 
be ramped back down relatively 
quickly. But Canadian cattlemen will 
have more options. The capacity to 
kill all of the approximately 800,000 
head of steers and heifers formerly 
sent to the United States gives 
Canada the potential to harvest an 
additional 294,000 metric tons (car-
cass weight basis) of young, export-
able beef.
Given that Canada and the 
United States likely will enter many 
markets at about the same time, 
both offer essentially the same qual-
ity and types of beef on a commod-
ity basis, and both are shipping beef 
similar distances to many foreign 
markets, a higher volume of export-
able beef in Canada will slow the 
speed at which the United States 
recovers market share in other 
countries. Canada’s separate export 
promotion programs and national 
cattle identifi cation program will 
make Canadian beef highly competi-
tive against U.S. beef.
MARKET OUTLOOK POST-BSE
Based on events since BSE-positive 
animals were found in the United 
States, the United States will fi nd 
itself in a different position in world 
TABLE 2. QUARTERLY JAPANESE BEEF IMPORTS (METRIC TONS), JFY 2003 AND 2004
TABLE 3. NUMBER OF CANADIAN CATTLE SLAUGHTERED IN CANADA AND THE 
UNITED STATES, 2000-2004
Continued on page 13
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The ethanol industry contin-ues to evolve. When we last checked in on the industry 
(Spring 2004 Iowa Ag Review), etha-
nol prices tracked with unleaded 
gasoline prices; production capacity 
was expanding; and Congress was 
considering an energy bill target-
ing higher usage of renewable fuels. 
The future looked good for ethanol 
as we computed a positive ethanol 
profi tability index for the foresee-
able future. Since then, ethanol 
and unleaded gasoline prices have 
diverged; the production expan-
sion has continued; Congress is still 
considering the energy bill; and the 
industry has gone through some 
growing pains.
THE ETHANOL AND GAS CONTINUUM
The connection between ethanol 
and unleaded gasoline prices had 
been a strong one. Looking at 
monthly rack (wholesale) price data 
for Omaha between 1982 and 2004, 
the ethanol price maintained a con-
sistent positive gap over unleaded 
gasoline prices, usually between 30¢ 
to 50¢ per gallon. In 2005, the pric-
ing relationship changed dramatical-
ly. Ethanol prices fell even though 
unleaded gasoline prices rose with 
crude oil prices. By March, ethanol 
was priced under unleaded gasoline. 
As Figure 1 shows, ethanol prices 
fell from a high of nearly $2.00 per 
gallon in November 2004 to $1.20 
per gallon in April and May 2005. 
Meanwhile, unleaded gas prices 
rose from $1.20 per gallon in Decem-
ber 2004 to over $1.60 per gallon 
in April 2005. More recent monthly 
statistics are not yet available, 
but daily prices show that ethanol 
prices have recovered to be on par 
with unleaded gasoline prices; both 
are around $1.80 per gallon on the 
Omaha wholesale market.
To look at what caused the 
divergence, we have to look at the 
relationship between ethanol and 
unleaded gasoline and the growth 
of the ethanol industry. Ethanol is 
both a complement to and a sub-
stitute for unleaded gasoline. Most 
ethanol consumers use ethanol 
through blended mixtures of un-
leaded gasoline and ethanol, with 
ethanol making up only a small 
percentage of the product. In this 
capacity, ethanol serves as a com-
plementary product to unleaded 
gas and ethanol usage increases 
with unleaded gas usage. But over 
the last several years, ethanol’s 
ability to compete with unleaded 
gasoline as automotive fuel, 
through the promotion of E-85 and 
fl exible fuel vehicles, has grown. 
This change is one factor breaking 
the link between unleaded gas and 
ethanol prices.
The growth in the ethanol in-
dustry has also changed the pricing 
relationship. Table 1 shows how 
ethanol production capacity has 
grown over the past year and the 
amount of expansion that is cur-
rently being undertaken. Last spring, 
ethanol industry numbers showed 
a planned expansion of roughly 14 
percent of capacity. Figures today 
show the production capacity actu-
ally increased by 22 percent, with 
plans to add an additional 1.0 billion 
gallons of ethanol capacity shortly. 
Almost all of the expansion to date 
has been in midwestern states. Over 
the past 15 months, Iowa has led the 
way, with over 240 million gallons 
in new ethanol production capacity. 
Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Mis-
souri have all added at least 40 mil-
lion gallons each. Looking forward, 
Iowa also is leading the way in future 
expansions. Current plans call for an 
additional 665 million gallons of pro-
duction capacity in Iowa alone. New 
ethanol plants are also planned in 
southwestern states. California, Colo-
rado, New Mexico, and Texas will 
each be adding at least 15 million gal-
lons of ethanol production capacity. 
With these planned expansions, etha-
nol capacity will soon reach 4.9 bil-
lion gallons per year. With Congress 
considering a renewable fuel stan-
dard of 7.5 billion gallons per year by 
2012, there is still plenty of room for 
the ethanol industry to continue to 
grow. If the energy bill is signed into 
law, the ethanol industry will need to 
FIGURE 1. ETHANOL AND GASOLINE PRICES (RACK PRICES IN OMAHA)
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FIGURE 2. ETHANOL STOCKS AND DAILY PRODUCTION
 
 
expand by an additional 53 percent 
to meet the new standard.
PRODUCTION HEATS UP
The growth in production capacity 
is matched by the growth in produc-
tion. Figure 2 shows the average dai-
ly production of ethanol per month 
and the amount of ethanol held in 
stock each month from August 2004 
to April 2005. The ethanol industry 
set an all-time production record 
for average daily production in Au-
gust 2004 and continued to set new 
records until February 2005. While 
production has cooled off recently, it 
is still quite high. Ethanol usage man-
aged to keep pace for awhile, but by 
March 2005, ethanol stocks started 
to accumulate. In economic terms, 
ethanol supply was outstripping 
demand. This put downward pres-
sure on ethanol prices, regardless of 
events affecting unleaded gas prices. 
As the current daily prices for 
ethanol are running 60¢ per gallon 
above the May 2005 monthly lev-
els, it looks as though the ethanol 
market has worked through the 
short-term oversupply toward a new 
equilibrium. The ethanol market is 
still an emerging market. The indus-
try still has domestic fuel markets 
with limited ethanol availability 
and faces signifi cant distributional 
and marketing issues. An ethanol 
infrastructure is being developed 
to produce, ship, and utilize etha-
nol, but it is not nearly as complete 
as the infrastructure for unleaded 
gas. Ethanol demand cannot react 
as quickly to price signals as can 
unleaded gasoline demand. Given 
these issues combined with the 
large leaps in ethanol production, 
it is not surprising that the ethanol 
market went through a price decline 
with a delayed recovery.
POSITIVE PROFITABILITY—FOR NOW
But as the numbers show, even the 
recent downturn in ethanol prices 
has done little to slow ethanol’s 
growth. Investors in the industry 
Continued on page 13
TABLE 1. ETHANOL PRODUCTION
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The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is a trade agreement between the Unit-ed States and Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatema-
la, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. 
Trade representatives from these Central American 
countries signed CAFTA in August 2004, and the 
Dominican Republic joined in 2005 (it is now offi cially 
abbreviated CAFTA-DR). CAFTA is targeted at reduc-
ing or eliminating trade barriers among the countries 
for many sectors, including information technology, 
agriculture, construction, pharmaceuticals, automo-
tives, medical equipment, and services.
In agriculture, corn, wheat, rice, soybeans, poultry, 
pork, beef, dairy, fruits, and vegetables are expected 
to benefi t from CAFTA. The House just approved the 
agreement, a month after the Senate passed the bill, and 
CAFTA is now headed for the president’s signature.
SUGAR, PAST AND PRESENT
One area of CAFTA that has received a great deal of at-
tention is the sugar agreement. The Central American 
countries and the Dominican Republic will eliminate 
their sugar tariffs over 15 years. The United States will 
CAFTA’s Projected Impact on U.S. Sugar
establish additional tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for the 
CAFTA countries, starting with an additional 107 thousand 
metric tons in the fi rst year and adding 2.64 thousand 
metric tons each year thereafter. The United States is also 
allowed to provide alternative forms of compensation to 
limit some sugar imports for stock management purposes.
The U.S. sugar industry had lined up in opposition 
to CAFTA. To look at the impact of this agreement on 
the U.S. sugar industry, we examined the historical, 
current, and projected sources of sugar for U.S. sugar 
utilization (consumption, stock changes, and exports). 
Figure 1 shows the breakdown for 1997. Total U.S. 
sugar utilization was 9.98 million short tons. U.S. sugar 
production accounted for 72 percent of this amount, 
while imports made up 28 percent. The CAFTA coun-
tries provided 6 percent of the sugar. Figure 2 shows 
the current situation. Total U.S. sugar utilization is 
10.11 million short tons. Domestic production covers 
83 percent, CAFTA country imports make up 3 percent, 
and other imports contribute 14 percent. Sugar imports 
from CAFTA countries fell from 661 thousand short tons 
in 1997 to 344 thousand short tons in 2005.
SUGAR FUTURE, WITH AND WITHOUT CAFTA
Figures 3 and 4 show projections for 2014. In Figure 3, 
the projections do not include the effects of CAFTA. U.S. 
sugar production covers 81 percent of U.S. sugar utiliza-
FIGURE 1. BREAKDOWN OF U.S. SUGAR UTILIZATION IN 
1997 BY SOURCE
FIGURE 2. BREAKDOWN OF U.S. SUGAR UTILIZATION IN 
2005 BY SOURCE
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FIGURE 5. U.S. AND WORLD SUGAR PRICES AND PROJECTIONS
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. PROJECTED BREAKDOWN OF U.S. SUGAR 
UTILIZATION IN 2014 BY SOURCE, ASSUMING NO CAFTA
FIGURE 4. PROJECTED BREAKDOWN OF U.S. SUGAR 
UTILIZATION IN 2014 BY SOURCE, ASSUMING PASSAGE OF CAFTA
tion, while CAFTA countries supply 3 percent. The Figure 
4 projections include the effects of CAFTA and assume 
2014 is the eighth year of the agreement. This implies 
a total sugar TRQ for the CAFTA countries of 488 thou-
sand short tons in 2014. If the additional CAFTA imports 
directly replace U.S. production, the impact of CAFTA on 
the U.S. sugar market is a 1 percent shift in market share 
from domestic production to the CAFTA imports. Assum-
ing that sugar loan rates remain at their current levels, 
the biggest shift would be in government stock holdings 
of sugar. In a March 2004 report, the USDA’s Economic 
Research Service analyzed a much larger sugar TRQ 
expansion for the Free Trade Area of the Americas. This 
study found that imports rose with the TRQ expansion, 
U.S. production fell by nearly the same amount (mainly 
because of use of USDA’s Payment-in-Kind Diversion 
Program), government sugar stocks increased, and 
prices remained at similar levels. This implies that there 
will be no impact on U.S. sugar prices under CAFTA. 
Figure 5 shows that the U.S. sugar price will remain far 
above the price at which we could import with or with-
out CAFTA. ◆
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When Japan reopens its borders to U.S. beef, producers of cattle from 
which beef will be harvested for 
export to that country must com-
ply with the regulations of the Beef 
Export Verifi cation Program (BEV) 
for Japan. The primary require-
ment affecting cattle producers 
is verifi cation that their cattle are 
less than 21 months of age at the 
time of slaughter. To qualify un-
der the BEV for Japan, producers 
and processors of any cattle that 
will provide beef for the Japanese 
market must participate in a Qual-
ity System Assessment (QSA) pro-
gram that has been pre-approved 
by the USDA’s Agricultural Market-
ing Service. That is, unlike Country 
of Origin Labeling (COOL), which 
accepts an auditable record, Ja-
pan is requiring that cattle must 
have been raised by cowherds, 
backgrounders, and feedlots that 
are covered under a QSA program. 
Records documenting age of the 
cattle and signed affi davits by the 
producer are needed, but these 
alone are not enough.
According to USDA, under the 
Japanese BEV program require-
ments, processors must have a 
QSA program to
1. Ensure that cattle pur-
chased or received from 
outside establishments and 
used in the program meet 
the age requirements. 
2. Evaluate and select suppli-
ers based on their ability 
to supply product that con-
forms. 
Cattle Producers Need a Quality System Assessment for Japan
3. Establish and implement the 
inspection or other activi-
ties necessary for ensuring 
that product purchased or 
received from outside es-
tablishments conforms to 
the age requirements. 
4. Have a documented proce-
dure addressing supplier 
selection, evaluation, and 
re-evaluation. 
5. Maintain records of the 
results of supplier evalu-
ations and any necessary 
actions arising from the 
evaluation.
6.  Maintain records to provide 
evidence of conformity to 
the receiving process and 
of the effective operation of 
the receiving process. 
WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN A 
QSA PROGRAM?
Under the current proposal, only 
cattle used to supply beef for Japan 
will need to be covered by a QSA 
program for age verifi cation. Cattle 
that are not part of a QSA program 
will still trade in the existing market 
but not with Japan. 
Producers who consistently sell 
to only one buyer, one with an ap-
proved QSA program, can simply fi ll 
out the QSA paperwork for that buy-
er. Examples include retained-owner-
ship producers who sell to only one 
packer and cowherd producers who 
sell to a large feedlot with a QSA 
program. A feedlot that buys feeder 
cattle must either have its own QSA 
program and qualify its suppliers un-
der that program or buy cattle that 
are covered under a packer’s QSA or 
an independent QSA program.
Packers and feedlots that have 
their own QSAs and approved sup-
plier lists are not likely to share 
these lists with competitors, and 
cattle are not transferable among 
individual packers’ QSA programs. 
On the other hand, independent 
QSA companies such as identifi ca-
tion companies will make their 
qualifi ed suppliers known in order 
to attract buyers to their customers’ 
cattle. Thus, producers who wish 
to qualify for export to Japan and 
to have more marketing fl exibility 
should consider joining an indepen-
dent QSA.
PROGRAM OPTIONS
Cattle producers have three options 
for selling cattle for beef to Japan. 
They can (1) participate in a packer’s 
QSA program, (2) develop their own 
QSA program and get it approved by 
USDA, or (3) participate in the QSA 
program of an independent compa-
ny. Producers participating in USDA 
Processed Verifi ed Programs are also 
eligible to sell into the BEV for Japan 
program. Among other things, the 
owner of a QSA program must con-
duct internal audits of its system and 
maintain a list of approved suppliers. 
Because fi nal approval for the BEV 
for Japan is pending, QSA programs 
may need to be updated to conform 
to the offi cial version.
Producers who participate in 
a single packer’s QSA will need to 
maintain records specifi c to that 
program. As a result, cattle covered 
under one packer’s QSA program 
cannot be sold to another packer. A 
producer who sells cattle to more 
than one packer and participates in 
each packer’s QSA program must 
maintain a separate set of docu-
ments for each company. 
Producers who develop and get 
approval for their own QSA program 
or participate in a QSA program in-
dependent of any individual packing 
company can sell to any buyer by 
documenting their QSA participa-
tion. While large feedlots may choose 
to develop and maintain their own 
QSA, smaller-scale producers may 
choose to participate in an estab-
lished independent QSA program. A 
list of USDA-approved QSA programs 
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can be found on the Web at http://
www.ams.usda.gov/lsg/arc/qsap.
htm. While most of the companies 
approved to date are feedlots and 
packers, other members in the sup-
ply chain may offer a QSA, including 
animal identifi cation companies. 
An advantage of participating in 
an independent program is that mul-
tiple systems can be managed under 
one umbrella program. Whereas a 
packing company will only want to 
document product requirements for 
its own product lines, an umbrella 
program can offer a broader range 
of verifi cations. Receiving animals 
from producers covered by these 
umbrella programs may also benefi t 
packers, who would not incur the 
risks associated with approving sup-
pliers. In addition to animal age, for 
example, a producer may want to 
document a breeding program or 
verify source of origin to increase 
marketing opportunities. 
QSAS AND COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN 
LABELING
QSA programs have been created to 
ensure compliance with specifi c im-
port requirements of other countries. 
As such, a QSA program will not 
be required for domestic programs 
such as the U.S. COOL program. The 
COOL program would require that 
producers keep records to verify 
compliance but would not require a 
pre-approved USDA system.
QSAS AND THE NATIONAL ANIMAL 
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
One of the realities of a QSA for Ja-
pan age verification is that the ani-
mals be identified and their birth 
date recorded, at least by group. 
The National Animal Identification 
System will require that all cattle 
be individually tagged with an ear 
tag. Producers may be able to par-
ticipate in a QSA program through 
their identification supplier. When 
evaluating identification suppliers, 
producers should ask the follow-
ing questions.
• Is the company’s QSA program 
approved for age verifi cation 
to Japan?
• Is the company’s QSA program 
compliant for COOL?
• What else does the company’s 
QSA program include?
PLAN NOW FOR FUTURE ACCESS
While the Japanese market is not 
currently open, some calves born 
this spring will likely be exported 
to Asian markets. To qualify for ex-
port to Japan, the animal must have 
been 20 months of age or younger at 
slaughter and born, raised, and pro-
cessed by farms and fi rms that are in 
a USDA pre-approved QSA program. 
Relatively few of these programs ex-
ist today, but the number is growing. 
Producers should consider their op-
tions: whether they want to establish 
their own QSA, sell to a buyer who 
has a QSA program, or participate 
in an independent QSA program. Al-
though any sector in the beef supply 
chain may develop a QSA program, 
identifi cation suppliers and producer 
organizations are expected to pro-
vide the independent QSA service. ◆
John Lawrence is a livestock economist 
and director of the Iowa Beef Center at 
Iowa State University. 
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price is less than the product of ex-
pected county income and a nation-
al target price. This type of program 
would provide efficient protection 
against both low prices and low 
yields while saving money on ad 
hoc disaster payments and the crop 
insurance program. To provide 
more insight into the cost of such a 
program at the national level, let’s 
look at cost estimates of such a pro-
gram for corn and soybeans at the 
national level.
Figures 3 and 4 compare the 
expected costs of a modifi ed GRIP 
program with the current program 
for corn and soybeans, respectively. 
Cost estimates are assumed to be 
made before a crop is planted, so 
both yields and prices are unknown. 
The revenue program is set up 
with a national target price of $2.46 
per bushel for corn and $5.40 per 
bushel for soybeans. These prices 
are equivalent to the amount of pro-
tection provided by the 2002 farm 
bill programs. Farmers in a county 
would receive a payment if their 
county yield times the season aver-
age price (the same price used to 
calculate current countercyclical 
payments) fell below their expected 
county yield (the county trend yield) 
times these target prices. As shown 
in Figures 3 and 4, the expected cost 
of such a revenue program for a crop 
year would depend on the expected 
season average price. If prices are 
expected to be strong, then expected 
costs will be low. Weak expected 
prices lead to high expected costs. 
This pattern between expected price 
and expected costs holds true for 
the current farm programs as shown.
We estimate that a revenue pro-
gram that provides the same level 
of per bushel support as does the 
current program to all planted acres 
would cost about the same for soy-
beans and would cost perhaps $1 
billion less for corn. Thus, Congress 
could likely save money by targeting 
revenue directly. In addition to the 
likely cost savings, additional sav-
ings would come about from the crop 
insurance program. Assuming that 75 
percent of the risk in the crop insur-
ance program would be rendered re-
dundant by a farm bill program that 
targeted revenue, we calculate that 
annual savings of approximately $1.4 
billion would accrue to the eight ma-
jor program crops. Such savings and 
the resulting transformation of the 
crop insurance program that would 
result might satisfy even the stron-
gest critics of the current program.
Advocates of a strong safety net 
for agriculture face the challenge of 
explicitly identifying why agriculture 
needs such a safety net, who should 
benefi t from a safety net, and what 
tool or tools should be used to devel-
op a cost-effective safety net. In se-
lecting the tools to be used, guidance 
might be taken from the fact that 
most farmers are choosing to insure 
their crops with revenue insurance. 
After all, it is with revenue that farm-
ers pay their production costs. ◆
FIGURE 3. COMPARISON OF THE EXPECTED COST OF THE CURRENT CORN 
PROGRAM VERSUS MODIFIED GRIP
FIGURE 4. COMPARISON OF THE EXPECTED COST OF THE CURRENT SOYBEAN 
PROGRAM VERSUS MODIFIED GRIP
Safety Net Design for the New Farm Bill
Continued from page 3
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still see the potential for profi t in 
the ethanol market. In March of 
this year, the Chicago Board of 
Trade began trading ethanol futures 
contracts, providing a fi nancial 
tool to mitigate risk in the ethanol 
industry. While the trading volume 
has been small, the ethanol futures 
price movements have paralleled the 
cash price movements. Over the last 
month, ethanol futures have gone up 
by 30¢ per gallon. The nearby con-
tracts are now trading in the $1.60 
per gallon range, with the end-of-
year contracts priced around $1.50 
per gallon. 
Given the ethanol futures con-
tracts, we have modifi ed our profi t-
ability index for ethanol. Our index 
compares the costs of the inputs 
into ethanol, corn and natural gas, 
to the revenues from ethanol and its 
co-products, such as dried distillers 
grains and solubles (DDGS). The index 
can be thought of as a gross margin 
for ethanol production, the difference 
between per unit revenues and costs 
of ethanol production. The index 
does not imply that all ethanol plants 
will make a profi t, but it does signal 
the potential for profi ts within the 
industry. With current ethanol, corn, 
and natural gas futures prices, we can 
calculate the expected values of the 
profi tability index for ethanol produc-
tion. Based on a dry-mill production 
technique for ethanol, one bushel of 
corn and 165 thousand British ther-
mal units of natural gas are needed to 
create 2.7 gallons of ethanol and 17 
pounds of DDGS. Figure 3 shows the 
historical and projected levels of the 
profi tability index. Given the futures 
prices on July 14, 2005, the profi tabil-
ity index for ethanol in August 2005 
is at 58¢ per gallon of ethanol, mean-
ing the per gallon expected revenues 
from ethanol and DDGS exceed the 
per gallon expected costs of corn and 
natural gas by 58¢. But the futures 
prices show a downward trend in 
ethanol prices and upward trends 
in corn and natural gas prices. For 
December 2005, the index is down to 
33¢ per gallon. It is still positive, re-
fl ecting the possibility of profi ts in the 
industry, but highlights the expected 
tightening in the ethanol market.
Over the last 15 months the 
ethanol industry has gone through 
a volatile period. The industry has 
experienced signifi cant growth and 
dramatic price swings. Given the 
planned expansions in ethanol plant 
capacities and a renewed effort by 
Congress to pass an energy bill, the 
ethanol industry is looking to con-
tinue its growth, but until the de-
mand and infrastructure for ethanol 
mature, we can expect to see more 
dramatic price swings in ethanol’s 
future that are not necessarily re-
lated to events in oil markets. ◆
FIGURE 3. HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED ETHANOL GROSS MARGINS
Ethanol Revisited
Continued from page 7
beef markets. Mexico has become 
and will remain the largest market 
for U.S. beef and beef variety meats 
for some time. To balance demand 
for the types and cuts of beef the 
U.S. industry produces, the United 
States will face an uphill battle in 
recapturing market share in other 
countries, especially in high-value 
markets that have been highly re-
sistant to accepting U.S. beef. Once 
Japan reopens to U.S. beef, that 
country’s beef safeguard mecha-
nism is likely to hamper these ef-
forts because of lower quarterly 
trigger levels. And, closing the bor-
der to Canadian live cattle has exac-
erbated these challenges because 
the United States will face Canada’s 
increased ability to place high-qual-
ity beef into world markets. ◆
A New World Market for U.S. Beef
Continued from page 5
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